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United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation: Potential
Competition Re-examined
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation/ decided by the
United States Supreme Court last term, suggested, but failed to resolve, important questions concerning the doctrine of potential competition.2 That doctrine has been applied by the Court to determine
whether a conglomerate merger3 violates section 7 of the Clayton
Act.4
The term "potential competition" encompasses two procompetitive effects that firms may have on concentrated markets. In
one sense, it describes the role played by a firm that is at present outside a market but will probably actually enter that market in the
relatively near future, either through expansion of its own facilities
(a de novo entry) or through the acquisition of a firm already within
the market. 0 This type of firm, which will be called a "probable actual entrant," is expected to have two,beneficial effects when it enters the concentrated market. First; if it enters de nova, there will
be an additional source of supply, more constraint on the market
power of existing firms, and a decrease in the possibility of collusion
by the leading firms in the market. 6 Second, in the short-run, the
probable actual entrant will, upon entry, inject an unsettling factor
into the market.7
· •
The second type of potential competitor is a firm outside a relatively concentrated market that, merely by its existence on the edge
1. 410 U.S. 526 (1973), revg. 332 F. Supp. 970 (D.R.I. 1971).
2. On the doctrine of potential competition, see United States v. Penn-Olin Chem.

Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651
(1964); United States v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Mich. 1968), afjd., 405
U.S. 562 (1972); United States v. Crocker-Anglo Natl. Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal.
1967); J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETlTION (1956); Berger & Peterson, Conglomerate
Mergers and Criteria for Defining Potential Entrants, 15 .ANTITRusr BuLL. 489 (1970);
Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285 (1967); Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations of the Anti-Merger Act, 68 CoLuM. L. REv.
1231 (1968); Hale & Hale, Potential Competition Under Section 7: The Supreme Court's
Crystal Ball, 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 171; Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws:
Some Reflections on the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1007 (1969); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1313
(1965).
3. A conglomerate merger is a merger between two firms that are neithe.r competitors nor in a buyer-seller relationship.
4. Cb. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970)). Section 7 bans mergers
and acquisitions that "substantially lessen competition,· or tend to create a monopoly"
"in any line of commerce in any section of the country.''
5. See Turner, supra note 2, at 1379-86.
6. Comment, Toehold Acquisitions and the Potential Competition Doctrine, 40
U, CHI. L. REv. 156, 159 (1972).
7. Turner, supra note 2, at 1383.
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of the market and irrespective of its actual intent to enter, is presumed to have a procompetitive effect on the pricing behavior of
firms within the market because they perceive it to be a likely entrant. 8 It is assumed that firms within the market react to the
presence of such a perceived potential entrant by limiting their price
to a level below that which they could otherwise command. Since
these firms can still take advantage of their market power and the
barriers to entry to reap above average profits, they have an incentive
to "limit price" in order to keep out the potential entrant. The effect of a perceived potential entrant on a market has been called
the "edge effect." 0
A merger that eliminates a potential competitor and consequently removes the beneficial impact that it has or may have on
the market has been found to violate section 7 of the Clayton Act. 10
The beneficial impact of a potential competitor may also be lost
through a merger where the acquiring firm is of such a size that its
presence in the market raises the barriers to entry. 11 Once entry
barriers are raised, the most probable actual entrants outside the
market will be less likely to enter, and the firms in the market,
perceiving that entry is now more difficult, will be able to raise
their prices somewhat without encouraging entry by perceived potential competitors.
In Falstaff problems were raised concerning the use of subjective
evidence in determining whether a firm is a potential competitor; 12
the legality of the acquisition of a large existing firm by a potential
competitor when a small, "toehold" firm could have been acquired; 18
and the extent to which incipient effects should be considered in
deciding 1vhether a conglomerate merger violates section 7.14 These
problems were not resolved because the case was decided on narrow
grounds, but the fact situation in Falstaff and the suggestions made
in that case by the various justices warrant close examination.
Falstaff involved the not uncommon situation in which the acquiring firm was allegedly both a probable actual entrant and a per-

s.

See id. at 1362-79.
9. See United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1232-34 (C.D. Cal,
1973), appeal docketed, 42 U.SL.W. 3471 (U.S., Feb. 9, 1974) (No. 73-1224).
IO. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1967).
11. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967); United States v.
Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 557-58 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
12. Brodley, supra note 2, at 332, 356-59.
13. See, e.g., Bendix Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REc. REP. ,i 19,288
(F.T.C. 1970), revd. on other grounds, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971). See generally Comment, Toehold Acquisitions and the Potential Competition Doctrine, 40 U. CHI. L. REv.
156 (1972).
14. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 76 (10th Cir. 1972), petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S., Oct. 25, 1972) (No. 72-637); Comment, supra
note 13, at 157 n.9.
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ceived potential competitor. The Court's opinion only discussed the
loss of Falstaff as a perceived potential competitor,15 but the concurring justices also considered the loss of Falstaff as a probable actual
entrant.16
The case involved Falstaff's 1965 acquisition of Narragansett
Brewing Company. Falstaff was the fourth largest producer of beer
in the United States at the time of the acquisition. Of the ten largest
brewers in the nation, only three, including Falstaff, did not sell in
New England.17 Four brewers who sold throughout the nation enjoyed competitive advantages in terms of advertising, prestige, and,
according to the Court, freedom from local weather and labor
problems.18 Consequently, Falstaff became interested in gaining national brewer status and, to that end, sought to enter the New England market.19 After negotiation with several brewers in the northeast,20 Falstaff concluded an agreement to acquire Narragansett, the
largest seller of beer in the New England market. 21
The district court denied a government request to have the acquisition enjoined; the court held that there was an insufficient probability that the acquisition would result in a substantial loss of
competition because Falstaff was not a potential competitor in the
New England market. 22 In determining whether Falstaff wa~ a potential competitor, the district court considered only the question of
probable actual entry and decided that question in favor of Falstaff
solely on the basis of statements by Falstaff's officers that the company had decided not to enter the market at all unless it could acquire a brewer with a viable distribution system: "[Falstaff] executives had carefully considered such possible alternatives as (1) acquisition of a small brewery on the east coast, (2) the shipping of beer
from its existing breweries, . . . (3) the building of a new brewery
on the east coast and other possible alternatives, but concluded that
none of said alternatives would have affected a reasonable probability
of a profitable entry for it in [the] New England Market." 23
15. See 410 U.S. at 532-37. Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined. While Justice Douglas joined in the
substantive portion of the Court's opinion, he also wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Marshall concurred in the result. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice-Stewart, dissented on the ground that the Justice Department's arguments before the Court were
based on a theory that had not been presented to the district court. Justices Brennan
and Powell did not participate in the decision of the case.
'
16. See 410 U.S. at 544-45 (Douglas, J.), 548,571 (Marshall, J.).
17. 410 U.S. at 528.
18. 410 U.S. at 529.
19. 410 U.S. at 529.
20. Brief for the United States at 31.
21. 410 U.S. at 528.
22, 332 F. Supp. at 972.
23. 332 F. Supp. at 972.

Michigan Law Review .

840

[Vol, '12:837

The Supreme Court remanded the case for a reassessment of Falstaff as a potential competitor.24 Five justices agreed that the district
court's assessment of the legality of the acquisition had been too
narrow, but they could not agree on the approach that the lower
court should have adopted.
The majority, in an opinion by Justice White, found that the
district court had erred in failing to consider whether Falstaff was
a perceived potential entrant:
The error lay in the assumption that because Falstaff, as a matter of
fact, would never have entered the market de novo, it could in no
sense be considered a potential competitor. More specifically, the District Court failed to give separate consideration to whether Falstaff
· was a potential competitor in the sense that it was so positioned on
the edge of the market that it exerted beneficial influence on competitive conditions in that market. 25
The question, then, was not settled by determining that the Falstaff
management had decided against entry by a toehold acquisition or
de novo. In order to determine whether Falstaff had a beneficial
effect as a perceived potential competitor, the court must consider
whether "it would appear to rational beer merchants in New England that Falstaff might well build a new brewery to supply the
northeastern market." 26 Because the case had to be remanded to
consider this question,. the Court felt there was no need to reach
such questions as whether a merger should be barred even if it had
no present effect on competition.27
Justice Marshall, in a lengthy opinion concurring in the result,
focused on Falstaff's role as a probable actual entrant and criticized
the trial court's handling of that question. Noting that the government had not alleged that Falstaff had a present procompetitive
effect as a perceived potential entrant, he did not think that the
lower court should be faulted for neglecting to consider that possibility.28 Nonetheless, as Justice Marshall saw it, the case should be
remanded because a finding that Falstaff was not a probable actual
entrant should not be based solely on the relatively unreliable subjective evidence of management intent when there was strong objective evidence to the contrary.29 Justice Marshall thought that the
majority's focus on present competitive effects was too narrow: 80
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

410
410
410
410
410
410
410

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at 537.
at 532-33.
at 533.
at 537.
at 545-46.
at 563-70.
at 557.
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Even if at the time of the merger the market structure had not yet
produced anticompetitive behavior, the role that a de novo entry by
Falstaff would play in deterring possible future anticompetitive practices should be evaluated.
Justice Douglas, while joining the Court's opinion, wrote a separate concurrence in which he agreed with Justice Marshall's assertion that the government need not demonstrate that Falstaff's
acquisition had marked immediate anticompetitive effects.81 He
would have been willing to direct the entry of judgment against
Falstaff on the basis of the evidence that Falstaff was the most likely
entrant and that the merger increased the trend in the market
toward concentration.82 Justice Douglas also argued strongly that
acquisitions like that in Falstaff should be discouraged because they
lead to an increase in the control of local businesses by out-of-state
companies.83
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. He felt
that the majority improperly interfered with the· decision of the
trier of fact. 84 He also rejected Justice Marshall's denigration of
subjective evidence and argued that any economic decision is largely
subjective.35
This Note will examine and criticize the perceived potential
competition doctrine suggested by the Court. Then, it will discuss
the questions raised in the concurrences concerning the use of subjective evidence and the role of incipient competitive effects. Finally,
an alternative approach that focuses on the acquisition of or the
possibility of acquiring small, "toehold" firms will be proposed.

I
The doctrine that a firm outside a relatively concentrated market
plays a procompetitive role as -a perceived potential competitor is
based on the economic theory of limit-pricing. According to this
theory, sellers in an oligopolistic inc;Iustry will weigh the possibility
of attracting new entrants when . making their price-output decisions.36 It is assumed that a firm in an oligopolistic market will recognize that the entry of another firm will detrimentally affect its
rate of return. Consequently, the firm may lower its price to a point
where this threat to future_ profitability is deterred but where it
31. 410 U.S. at 539.
32. 410 U.S. at 545.
33. 410 U.S. at 542-44.
34. 410 U.S. at 576.
35. 410 U.S. at 575-76.
36. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 221-22
(1970): P. STEINER, MERGERS: MOTIVES, EFFECTS, POLICIES ch. 10 (forthcoming).
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continues to earn a supernormal rate of return made possible by
the oligopolistic setting. In other words, the presence of perceived
potential entrants may cause firms in a concentrated market to limitprice. Through this edge effect, potential competition serves as a
partial substitute for actual competition.37
If limit-pricing is to occur and is to give rise to a procompetitive
effect that will be lost in merger, it would seem that at least four
conditions are necessary: (I) The structure of the relevant market
must be conducive to oligopolistic pricing; (2) the perceived potential competitor must be "unique" in that it is the only or one of the
few most favored potential entrants; (3) the firm outside the market
must be perceived by those within the market as likely to enter and
as likely to enter in a way that firms in the market would want to
deter; and (4) the general condition of entry for the relevant market
must be such that the profit-maximizing strategy would be to limitprice.
The need for an oligopolistic market is clear:' A perceived potential entrant cannot affect prices in a market unless those already
within the market can themselves influence the prices. If firms within
the market can individually have a significant effect on prices, an
oligopoly exists by definition.38 In an oligopoly setting rival firms
recognize the interdependence of their price-output decisions. 30
Therefore, these firms may tacitly coordinate their pricing and output decisions to earn above normal rates of return. Because firms
in this situation will want to preserve their market position in order
to continue making these higher profits, the presence of a perceived
potential competitor may lead to limit-pricing and a lower market
37. C. WILCOX, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 7-8 (Temp. Natl.
Econ. Comm. Monograph No. 21, 1940).
38. F. SCHERER, supra note 36, at 10. Economists commonly use concentration ratios
to determine whether a given market is a probable oligopoly. The concentration ratio
is expressed as the percentage of sales attributable to a certain number of firms in the
market (usually four or eight firms). Different economists use different standards. See,
e.g., J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 128 (1959) (four-firm concentration ratio of 50
per cent constitutes high-moderate concentration); U.S. Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines, I TRADE REG. REP. 1J 4510, at 6884 (1971) (four-firm concentration ratio
of 75 per cent indicates a highly concentrated market); C. KAYSEN &: D. TURNER, ANTITRusr POLICY: AN ECONOl\llC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 72 (1959) (a loose oligopoly contains
less than 20 firms that supply 75 per cent of the market, with no firm supplying more
than 10-15 per cent; a tight oligopoly is composed of eight or fewer firms supplying 50
per cent of the market, with the largest firm supplying more than 20 per cent).
39. As Chamberlin put it:
If each seeks his maximum profit rationally and intelligently, he will realize tlmt
when there are only tivo or a few sellers hi~ own move has a considerable effect
upon his competitors, and that this makes it idle to suppose that they will accept
without retaliation the losses he forces upon them. Since the result of a cut by
any one is inevitably to decrease his own :r.rofits, no one will cut, and, although the
sellers are entirely independent, the equilibrium result is the same as though there
were a monopolistic agreement beaveen them.
E. CHA?.mERLIN, THE THEORY OF MoNOPOLJSTIC COMPETITION 48 (6th ed. 1950).
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price than would otherwise occur. If the market were competitively
structured, the market price would be set by the marketplace, not
the individual firms. Thus, a firm outside the market would have no
effect on price. As Professor Turner has said, for a perceived potential competitor to make a difference "[t]he market concerned must
be an oligopoly market: the number of actual sellers must be sufficiently small for them to be able collectively, though not necessarily
collusively, to maintain prices above competitive levels." 40 At least
on the basis of objective criteria, this structural condition appears
to have been satisfied in the New England market involved in Falstaff, even if there was some competition among the firms in the
market, for, in 1965, the year of the acquisition, the four-firm concentration ratio in that market was 61.3 per cent, which has been
considered indicative of a tight oligopoly.41
The second condition arises from the fact that a merger will not
eliminate a procompetitive effect arising from limit-pricing unless
that merger involves an outside firm that was a uniquely likely entrant, or, at least, one of the few most likely entrants.42 If there were
many equally likely entrants, the firms that remain on the edge of
the market after an entry would continue to exert a strong restraining effect on price decisions of sellers. In that situation the loss of
one perceived potential, competitor would be insignifican,t, as it
would not result in a change in the pricing policies of those in the
market. Although detailed information on potential entrants for
the New England beer market is unavailable, it seems reasonable
to believe that Falstaff, as a regional brewer, was one of a few specially favored potential entrants. In market-extension cases43 such
as Falstaff it is not unusual for the chief source of rivalry to be a
firm that is already producing in a region that includes several other
geographic markets. 44 Even among the regional brewers, Falstaff held
a unique position as a potential entrant for the New England mar40. Turner, supra note 2, at 1363. See also Davidow, supra note 2, at 1244.
41. 410 U.S. at 27-28. Because the four-firm concentration ratio was above 50 per
cent and the largest firm, Narragansett, had 20 per cent of the market, the New England market at the time of the acquisition came within the Kaysen and Turner· definition of tight oligopoly. See n_ote 38 supra. Thus, even though there was no evidence
that the firms were engaging in blatantly anticompetitive conduct, 410 U.S. at 550 (Marshall, J., concurring), the structural condition under which perceived potential competition is assumed to have a beneficial impact was present.
42. Turner, supra note 2, at 1363. See also Davidow, supra note 2, at 1247.
43. A market-extension merger is a conglomerate merger involving tw·o firms selling
the same product in different geographic markets. Davidow, supra note 2, at 1232.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129, 148 (N.D.
Cal.), affd., 385 U.S. 37 (1967); Foremost Dairies, Inc., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. 1J 15,877, at 20,689 (F.T.C. 1962). In the beer industry, the "most
promising source of new competition is that of [an] established brewer moving into
a new geographic market." Elzinga, The Beer Industry, ,in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRY 189, 202 (4th ed. W. Adams 1971).
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ket. Of the three regional brewers among the top ten not already
selling in that market, Falstaff was the largest. 45 The other two,
Hamm and Coors, were significantly smaller than Falstaff; and, moreover, their closest breweries were much farther from New England
than Falstaff's.46
It is not sufficient that the outsider's position be unique. All
firms within the market must also perceive the outsider as likely to
enter in a way that they would like to discourage. Justice White
recognized the importance of the perception of the existing sellers,47
but he failed to consider the possibility that the sellers could have
,any one of several different perceptions as to the form-de novo
entry, acquisition of a toehold firm, or acquisition of a leading firm
-that the entry of the perceived potential competitor would take.
The kind of perception could be critical to the incentive to deter
entry. For instance, existing sellers will normally be more anxious
to deter de novo entry than toehold acquisition, because the former
would immediately add new capacity and would be most likely to
reduce their post-entry output or price.48 However, because it typically does not add substantial new capacity, entry by acquisition of
a leading firm, if perceived to be the most likely method, would not
be as likely to lead to limit-pricing.49 It is unlikely that Falstaff was
perceived as a potential de novo entrant because of the nature of
cost and demand conditions in the beer industry, which encourage
a prospective entrant to enter a market in a manner that will allow
it to operate as near to optimal scale as possible. Because the costs
of transporting beer are relatively high, 50 most beer production takes
place at less than optimal scale in geographically dispersed plants.1l1
45. 410 U.S. at 553 (Marshall, J., concurring).
46. Brief for the United States at 5.
47. See 410 U.S. at 533-34 &: 534 n.13.
48. However, if existing sellers expect that a toehold entry might increase the acquiring firm's chances of successful market penetration, they may be more anxious to
deter toehold entry than de novo entry.
49. Bain, for example, excludes from bis definition of entry the "change of ownership or control of existing operating capacity." J. BAIN, supra note 2, at 5. This conclusion assumes that the firm presently in the market does not view itself as a likely
subject of a leading-firm acquisition. Otherwise, it might follow a limit-pricing policy
so as to minimize its chances of being taken over.
50. Scherer, The Determinants of Industrial Plant Size: An International Com•
parisons Study, in F. SCHERER, A. BECKENSTEIN, E. KAUFER &: R. MURPHY, THE ECONOIIIICS
OF MULTI-PLANT OPERATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS STUDY ch. 3, at 44 (Nov.
1971). According to Scherer's estimates, transport costs amount to 7.8 cents on each
dollar's worth of beer. The trend toward package sales, see Elzinga, supra note 44, at
211, has made transportation costs even more significant, because the beer must be delivered to a large number of small-package dealers.
51. Scherer estimates that the minimum optimal scale (MOS) in brewing is 4.!i million barrels per year. The cost penalty of operating at one-third MOS was estimated
at 5 per cent. In other words, a brewery producing 1.5 million barrels per year would
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Moreover, since demand for beer is only slowly increasing,52 any
addition of substantial new capacity is likely to have a depressing
effect on price.53 Through acquisition of a leading firm an entrant·
could be operating closer to optimal scale in a shorter period of time
·without also increasing supply and thereby depressing the price.
Thus, existing sellers would rationally perceive entry by leading-firm
acquisition to be more likely than de novo entry.54 In fact, the
director of marketing for Narragansett testified that it had never
occurred to those ·within the market that Falstaff would attempt a
de novo entry.55 Nonetheless, Falstaff may have been perceived as
a likely entrant by- toehold acquisition. By acquiring a small existing
brewer Falstaff could achieve, to some extent, the advantages that
could be achieved by acquisition of a leading firm. Because toehold
entry will allow an entrant to capture a greater share of the market
more quickly than if it had entered de novo, the cost disadvantages
of operating below optimal scale are mitigated. Furthermore, since
this form of entry adds less new capacity than a de novo entry does,
the depressing effect on price is less. There was evidence that Falstaff
had previously expanded by acquiring failing breweries and strengthening their competitive position.56 Consequently, Falstaff may have
been perceived as a likely toehold entrant, and existing sellers may
experience 5 per cent higher costs than a brewery of MOS size. Scherer, supra note 50,
at 29.
An examination of the operations of the ten largest breweries reveals that a significant proportion of them are operating plants below MOS. Given their level of sales
in 1972, see STANDARD &: PooR'S INDUSTRY SURVEYS: Liquor-Basic Analysis L57 (Oct. 18,
1973 (section 2)), Anheuser-Busch, Schlitz, and Pabst, the three largest brewers, could
operate, respectively, six, four, and three plants at MOS. Falstaff could operate only
one and one-half MOS plants. But, in fact, Anheuser-Busch operates eight breweries,
Schlitz operates nine breweries, and Pabst operates five breweries, while Falstaff was
operating seven breweries at the time of suit. MooDY's INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 214, 2468,
2917, 534 (1972).
52. The rate of growth in the New England market was termed "substantial" by
Justice Marshall, 410 U.S. at 550, although, at less than 2.5 per cent a year, it was less
than the national growth rate. The average compound annual rate of growth in the
national market for the ten years preceding 1972 was approximately 3.8 per cent.
STANDARD&: POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 51, at L57.
53. In fact, such entry could be economically undesirable. The addition of new capacity would mean that other firms would be operating at a scale even further below
the optimum so that there would be a loss in productive efficiency. See note 51 supra.
54. In a study of several different markets Harris found that, when the growth of
demand and the profit rate are relatively low, "it is much less reasonable to suppose
that even a bona fide potential competitor would enter with new capacity if he could
not merge." M. Harris, Entry, Barriers to Entry, and Limit Pricing 148 (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1973).
55. 410 U.S. at 546 n.2 (Marshall, J., concurring). Falstaff also argued that it was
an unlikely de novo entrant because it was "firmly committed against attempting to
penetrate" the New England market until "it could obtain a strong, viable distributor
organization therein." Jurisdictional Statement of United States at 21.
.
56. 410 U.S. at 552 n.7 (Marshall, J., concnrring).
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thus have had some incentive to limit-price, although a weaker incentive than if Falstaff were perceived as a likely de novo entrant.
Even if Falstaff were perceived as a likely de novo or toehold en•
trant, the general entry conditions for the New England market may
have made a limit-pricing response unlikely. According to theory,
the likelihood that limit-pricing will occur is dependent upon the
barriers to entry for the market. 57 Impediments to market entry may
take the form of high production costs due to existing economies of
scale,58 high advertising costs due to product differentiation,llo high
costs of capital, 00 and any additional costs that must be borne by
an entrant.61 There are four possible conditions of entry: easy, ineffectively impeded, effectively impeded, or blockaded. In a market
with easy entry conditions any price above the competitive price will
attract entry, and in a blockaded market62 a strategy with the goal of
deterring entry is not necessary because the profit-maximizing price
is below the entry-forestalling price. In an ineffectively impeded market the most profitable approach is to maximize short-run profits.
Only if the general conditions of entry can be characterized as "effectively impeded" is the most profitable strategy to forgo some shortrun profits and limit-price to deter entry and maximize long-run
profits. In practice, there is a continuum of possible strategies; the
extent to which existing firms will limit-price depends on any longrun cost advantages that they have, the expected rates of market
share erosion and technological change, and the discount rate that
they apply to future profits. 63
The general condition of entry of the New England beer market,
on the basis of the little information available, would seem to have
been close to ineffectively impeded, so a limit-pricing strategy on
the part of existing sellers would have been unlikely. If the existing
sellers have no long-run cost advantages over the outsider, a limitpricing strategy on the part of existing sellers is unlikely, for limitpricing may fail to keep the potential entrant out of the market or
may require too great a loss of pro.fits for the inside firms. Narra•
gansett probably had long-run cost disadvantages relative to Falstaff.
Narragansett was typical of the brewers in the New England market
57. J. BAIN, supra note 2, at 4-6. These barriers can be examined in two frameworks
-the "immediate condition of entry" and the "general condition of entry." The former
refers to the highest price level that existing firms can reach without inducing the entry
of the most favored entrant. The latter refers, inclusively, to each successive price level
over which each highly favored firm would successively enter the market. Id. at 9.
58. Id. at 14-16.
59- Id.
60. Id.
61- G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968).
62. J. BAIN, supra note 2, at 21-22.
63. Id.
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in that it was operating far below minimum optimal scale (MOS).
Its market share of about 20 per cent translates to about 1.2 million
barrels per year, or below one-third MOS. Thus, Narragansett's production costs were at least 5 per cent higher than at MOS.~4 In the
long run, Falstaff could e..xpect to capture a market share sufficient
to enable it to operate as close or closer to MOS than Narragansett.
Additionally, since Falstaff would be operating on a nationwide
scale, it would enjoy promotional economies that local brewers like
Narragansett could not realize. 65 Nor would the national brewers
(Anheuser-Busch, Schlitz, Pabst, and Miller) that were already selling
in New England be expected to enjoy any significant long-run cost
advantages over Falstaff. Once it entered, Falstaff could also realize
the advertising economies and other advantages of national brewer
status. 60
In the short run, Falstaff would be disadvantaged in that it would
have to incur additional costs in making its initial penetration of
the New England market. 67 Because the price in the market would
partly determine the extent of Falstaff's losses during this period,
a limit-pricing strategy might seem to be a rational method to deter
entry. However, all entrants, including those that .are existing sellers,
had to, at some time in the past, absorb initial entry losses. Falstaff,
because of its strong position in other markets, was in a particularly
good position to overcome these barriers. Moreover, price may not
have been the critical factor in Falstaff's ability to bear short-run
losses, since the significance of additional short-term costs depends
on both the level and rate of the entrant's market penetration. Because it would be distributing a national brand after entry, Falstaff
might have been expected to achieve an acceptable share of the
market in a relatively short time, particularly if it entered by toehold acquisition. Consequently, limit-pricing probably would not
have deterred entry.
Again, the Court's opinion failed fully to appreciate the com64. See note 51 supra.
65. Because of the high intensity of advertising in the brewing industry, see Elzinga,
supra note 44, at 209, these economies may be particularly important. See 410 U.S. at
553 (Marshall, J., concurring). But see Horowitz & Horowitz, Firms in a Declining Mar•
ket: The Brewing Case, 13 J. INDus. EcoN. 129, 151 (1965).
66. Since market-extension mergers often involve entry by a large producer already
in several other markets, potential entrants in such cases will usually not be significantly disadvantaged relative to existing sellers. Therefore, limit-pricing may be
unlikely in such cases: "['I']he critical price depends on the cost of the most efficient
potential entrant and, hence, on just which firms are already in the group. It may then
not be in the interest of existing firms to try to prevent the entry· of very efficient producers, since this might require an unprofitably low price." Modigliani, New Developments on the Oligopoly Front, 66 J. PoL. EcoN. 215, 231 (1958).
67. See generally R. CAVES, AMERICAN lNDUSl'RY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE
23-26 (3d ed. 1972).
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plexity of any determination that Falstaff had an edge effect on
behavior in the New England market. Justice White appears to
have assumed that, if Falstaff was perceived as a potential entrant,
firms in the market would necessarily limit-price. The much more
detailed factual analysis suggested above is necessary before that
conclusion can be made.
A more basic criticism of the Court's opinion would call into
question the very validity of the perceived potential competition
doctrine because its foundation, limit-pricing theory, is weak. The
difficulty in that economic rationale lies in its assumptions about the
knowledge and motivations of economic actors. Limit-pricing theorists seem to assume both imperfect knowledge on the part of some
firms and perfect knowledge on the part of others. 68
The theory assumes that the firm on the edge of the market will
take the present market price as an upper limit for a post-entry
price and that this perception will affect its decision to enter. It also
assumes that firms already in the market believe that the bystander
views the present market price in this way and that they will choose
to and be able to limit their prices in a way that effectively keeps
the bystander out.
There is a basic flaw in the assumption made about the outsider's perception-and, consequently, in the assumption made about
the insider's view of the outsider's perception-for there are a variety
of ways in which a potential entrant may view the relation between
existing and post-entry prices. As Modigliani pointed out, the
"price that is relevant to the potential entrant is the price after
entry." 69 A leading limit-pricing theorist has hypothesized that a
potential entrant is "likely to read the current price policies of established firms as some sort of 'statement of their future intentions'
regarding their [pricing] policies." 70 But a potential entrant may
regard the limit-price as a bluff and predict that the existing firms'
post-entry reaction will be to reduce output and make room for the
entrant, rather than to reduce price further. 71 If the existing sellers
recognize that the outsider will make this prediction, they will
hardly be inclined to limit their prices. The likelihood that a limitpricing strategy will be perceived as a bluff is especially high when
the outside firm has considerable knowledge about cost and demand
conditions in the product market, knowledge that would normally
68. Berger & Peterson, supra note 2, at 492.
69. Modigliani, supra note 66, at 216 (emphasis original).
70. J. BAIN, supra note 2, at 95.
71. E. SINGER, ANTITRU5r ECONOMICS 99 (1968). See also Berger & Peterson, supra
note 2, at 492. Stigler questions limit-pricing theory because it assumes that a prospective entrant will "believe that after his entry a colluding group will not revise its
policy so that all will earn returns above the competitive level." G. STIGLER, supra note
61, at 21.

March 1974]

Notes

849

be present in market-extension cases such as Falstaff. In fact, Falstaff
may have had an unusually accurate perception of the probable postentry reactions of at least the national firms because it competed
with them in other markets. If a bystander firm perceives the low
price to be a bluff, that price will not be a significant factor in its
decision whether to enter the market. 72
Moreover, even if the bystander does not believe that ·the low
price is a bluff, potential profitability in the new market may not be
determinative in the firm's decision to enter.73 A firm may also decide to expand .for sales maximization motives,74 considerations of
prestige,76 or economies in advertising. 76 Indeed, there was evidence
that Falstaff was motivated by these considerations in deciding to
enter the New England market. 77 To the extent that firms already
in the market realize that price may not be the most important
determinant of whether a bystander will decide to enter the market,
their decisions will not be influenced by the presence of a perceived
potential entrant.
Additionally, even if existing sellers believe that their price decisions will influence the attractiveness of entry, the presence of a
perceived potential entrant may not change current pricing behavior
in a concentrated market. The firms in the market may choose to
adopt some other entry-preventing strategy, such as raising barriers
to entry by increasing advertising expenditures.78 Also, there may be
other effective constraints on oligopolistic pricing, so that the perceived potential competitor makes no difference. For example, pricing above competitive levels will occur only if there is at least tacit
coordination among the firms in the market. Although coordina72. There is little empirical evidence that price has a determinative effect on
whether firms decide to enter a market. However, one recent study found a statistically
significant positive relationship between pre-entry profit rates and actual entry. M.
Harris, supra note 54, at 155.
73. Economists have argued that a variety of other motives besides profit maximization may influence firm behavior. See generally J. MARKHAM, CONGLOMERATE ENTERPRISE
AND PUBLIC POLICY 28-30 (1973); Baldwin, The Motives of Managers, Environmental
Restraints, and the Theory of Managerial Enterprise, 78 Q.J. EcoN. 238 (1964); Blake
&: Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 422, 460
(1965); Machlup, Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral, Managerial, 57 AM.
EcoN. REv. 1 (1967); Mueller, A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers, 83 Q.J. EcoN. 643
(1969); Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. EcoN. REv.
1032 (1963).
74. Baumol has pointed out that businessmen may be particularly interested in sales
growth because of its relation to their product's image, their credit-rating, their personnel relations, and their personal career advancement. W. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH 46-47 (1959).
.
75. Blake&: Jones, supra note 73, at 460.
76. Id.
77. See 410 U.S. at 553,571 (Marshall, J., concurring).
78. See note 88 infra.
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tion may be fairly likely in an oligopoly because of the firms' mutual
recognition of interdependence, it will often be difficult to achieve. 70
Firms in concentrated markets may have divergent outlooks and
preferences, resulting from variations in cost functions, 80 different
time horizons with respect to short- and long-run profit maximization, 81 and product differentiation.82 Moreover, costs of coordination
and enforcement may limit oligopolistic pricing.83 There are reasons
to believe that, even if there had been no perceived potential entrants, brewers in the New England market would not have been
able to raise their prices significantly above the competitive level.
Tacit coordination may have been difficult because of the differing
market problems of national and local brewers,84 problems with idle
capacity due to the seasonal nature of the demand for beer, 80 and
efforts to maintain a price differential between premium and nonpremium brands. 86 In fact, there was evidence that there was considerable competition in the New England market. 87 Were this in
fact the case, the existence of a perceived potential competitor would
make no difference, because actual competition in the market would,
in itself, be an effective constraint on pricing.
Even where actual competition is not a constraint, perceived po•
tential competition may not have a beneficial effect if the firms in
the market are reluctant to implement limit-pricing because coordination is difficult to achieve.88 It is arguable that coordination is not
79. Bain acknowledges that the effect of potential competition on an oligopolistic
market may be lessened because "collusion of either the e.xpress or· tacit variety may be
imperfect in various degrees." J. BAIN, supra note 2, at 33.
80. See generally F. SCHERER, supra note 36, at 192-98.
81. Fog, How Are Cartel Prices Determined?, 5 J. INDUS. EcoN. 16, 19-20 (1956).
82. F. SCHERER, supra note 36, at 186-92.
83. See Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN,
L. REv. 1562, 1566-75 (1969). See also G. STIGLER, supra note 61, at 39-56.
84. Elzinga, supra note 44, at 210.
.
85. STANDARD&: PooR's INDUSTRY SURVEYS, supra note 51, at L57. Because beer cannot
be stored for long periods of time without deterioration and storage costs may be significant, there is an incentive for each firm to cut its price in order to increase its share
of the market during periods of low demand, such as winter.
86. Elzinga, supra note 44, at 205-07.
87. 410 U.S. at 550 (Marshall, J., concurring). It is also possible that an effective constraint on pricing in the New England market was the ability of firms outside the
market profitably to ship in beer if prices reached a certain level. If this price level was
below the limit-price for forestalling entry, the presence of a perceived potential entrant
would make no difference. In fact, Liebmann and P. Ballantine&: Sons, both of which
sold significant amounts of beer in New England, were located in the New York City
area. Brief for the United States at 10.
88. Where this is the case, an existing seller may prefer to adopt strategics other
than limit-pricing in order to keep out potential entrants. For e.xample, the existing
seller could indicate that, if a new firm were to enter the market, it would cause e.xtra
expenses for the newcomer (perhaps by sharply raising its advertising budget) or reduce
the newcomer's opportunity for making any profit (perhaps by engaging in price wars
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necessarily required to implement limit-pricing. Unlike the situation
in which one firm seeks to impose a higher price on the rest of the
market, a decision to limit the price may be imposed by a firm that
unilaterally decides to adopt that strategy, for the other firms may
lose substantial sales if they refuse to follow suit. Nonetheless, a firm
may be reluctant to initiate a price reduction for fear that, the other
firms ·will misread its intentions and start a price war leading to
lower profits for all. 89 Furthermore, once effected, a limit-price
achieved without coordination may not be stable because marginalist
output determination rules do not apply in this setting.00 While
total group output is determinant of the limit-price, no rule indicates
to each individual firm how much of the total output ·to produce.
Consequently, absent overt agreement, it is likely that the group will
produce too much or too little, and the limit-pricing •will break
down. This natural tendency toward breakdown is greater in markets
where, as in the beer industry, significant economies of scale provide
an especially strong incentive to produce a larger share of the output
and where there are the problems of coordination discussed above. 91
Not only was the perceived potential competition doctrine that
was accepted by Justice White flawed in both application and theory,
but his brief opinion-also failed to recognize the benefits that may
be derived from the merger of a perceived potential competitor with
a large existing seller. Two kinds of benefits could be lost by forbidding leading-firm acquisitions by perceived potential entrants.
One is that derived from the threat of takeover of firms in the market
by the bystander.92 Proscription of leading-firm acquisitions would
when the newcomer's start-up expenses were high). See generally F. MACHLuP, THE
EcoNOIIIICS OF SELLERS' COIIIPE'ITilON 535 (1952). Moreover, rather than limiting·its price
to discourage entry, an existing seller may discourage entry by attaching itself more
securely to its present customers by ties of goodwill. F. SCKERER, supra note 36, at 222 •
. 89. It has been noted that the "desire to avoid cutthroat competition tends to make
for downward price rigidity" in oligopolies. w. FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG THE FEW
227 (1960). Machlup has said of the firm in an uncoordinated oligopoly: "Such an
oligopolist appears to be on the horns of a dilemma: low prices might induce his actual
competitors to start competing vigorously or even belligerently; high prices might induce potential competitors to appear on the scene and claim a share in the market."
F. MACHLuP, supra note 88, at 537.
90. F. ~CKERER, supra note 36, at 223.
91. Although there has been little direct empirical study of the extent to which
limit-pricing actually occurs, studies have been made of the relation between the height
of barriers to entry and profit rates. See, e.g., J. BAIN, supra note 2, at 190-201; Mann,
A Note on Barriers to Entry and Long Run Profitability, 14 ANTITRusr BULL. 845 (1969);
Mann, Seller Concentration, Barriers to Entry, and Rates of Return in Thirty Industries,
1950-1960, 48 REv. EcoN. STAT. 296 (1966). Scherer, however, points to some examples
of actual limit-pricing at various points in time in the copper, rayon, coal, and copying
machine industries. F. SCHERER, supra note 36, at 215-16, 225.
92. Berry, Economic Policy and the Conglomerate Merger, in CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: OPINION AND ANALYSIS, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REY. 266, 280 (Spec. ed.,

I ,

852

[Vol. '12:83'7

Michigan Law Review

partially insulate existing producers from external incentives to remain efficient. If such acquisitions were 11llowed, the threat of take.overs might lead existing management to perform efficiently in order
to keep shareholders satisfied. 93 However, the loss of this benefit
would not be total, because there will often be firms or groups that
pose a takeover threat but are not perceived potential entrants and
firm acquisition by them will not be barred by the rule.
A second, more important cost of prohibiting the acquisition of
a leading firm by a perceived potential competitor is the loss of the
competitive benefits that would result from the actual entry. A number of economies could be derived from such mergers. 04 More significantly, the takeover may have desirable effects on the behavior
of other firms in the market if the injection of a new decision-making
entity shakes up existing market behavior patterns and upsets oligopolistic pricing practices. 95 A beneficial result would be most expected from actual entry into a tight oligopoly.00 Because the situation is not likely to be competitive before the acquisition, no substantial increase in uncompetitive behavior would be possible, and
there may be a chance that new mrnership of one of the firms would
break do,;rn existing interdependent behavior. 97 In contrast, the effects of entry by large-firm acquisition into a more loosely structured
oligopolistic market may be expected to be, on balance, undesirable.
In that situation, there is little to be gained by the injection of a new
competitive force, and there may be significant losses if the new entity becomes a dominant firm or a price leader, or otherwise contributes to an increase in the possibility of oligopolistic behavior.
Thus, the costs of proscribing ,leading-firm acquisitions by perceived
potential entrants would theoretically be greatest in a tightly oligopolistic market, precisely the situation in which the benefits of
retaining the firm on the edge of the market would also be greatest.08
Spring 1970); Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73

J.

POL. EcoN,

110, 113 (1965).
93. Berry, supra note 92, at 280; Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust
Laws, 73 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 555, 562-63 (1973). However, other, less desirable reactions arc
possible. For example, management could attempt to discourage takeovers by disguising
the profitability of the enterprise.
94. See generally Turner, supra note 2, at 1323-39. See also Blake, supra note 93, at
562-63. Bork has argued that the loss of economies of integration would be a significant
cost of proscribing leading-firm acquisitions. REPORT OF THE WHITE HousE TASK FoRCE
ON ANTITRUST POLICY Guly 5, 1968), in 115 CONG. REc. 13890, 13905-06 (1969),
95. Turner, supra note 2, at 1383.
96. See P. STEINER, supra note 36.
97. "In practically every case, entry led to a permanent lowering of leading firm
profit rates and pricing moderation if not outright price cuts. The inference is that
important entry did exert a long run impact on industry performance and that large
entrants were not successfully digested into any post-entry collusion." M. Harris, supra
note 54, at 158.
98. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
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This would suggest that on absolute prohibition such as that implied
by the plurality opinion in Falstaff is not the most appropriate way
to deal with the problem of perceived potential competition.
Justice White's opinion did not look as closely as possible at the
benefits and costs of prohibiting the acquisition of Narragansett.
The merger would probably not have had anticompetitive effects. In
some cases, the replacement of the remaining major local firm by a
national firm may facilitate cooperation by the nationals in the
market by replacing an inhibiting factor with a firm that shares its
fellow nationals' interests.99 But Narragansett was a declining and
disadvantaged firm vis-a-vis the nationals100 and thus probably had
no important limiting effect on their behavior. In fact, it probably
preferred to price higher than the national brewers. A closer analysis
may have actually revealed procompetitive entry effects, for the combination of Falstaff's national status and Narragansett's local marketing experience may have created a more effective rival for the national brewers in the market.
The foregoing discussion should suggest that the approach taken
by Justice White in Falstaff was not adequate. He was satisfied to
consider only whether Falstaff was perceived as a potential entrant
and would not go further to enquire whether its existence on the
edge of the market actually had a beneficial influence. Some of the
conditions theoretically necessary for the effective functioning of the
theory of limit-pricing as a basis of the perceived potential competition doctrine may have been absent in the Falstaff situation, and
there are also underlying weaknesses in the doctrine itself. Because
of these uncertainties, direct proof of a beneficial edge effect should
perhaps be required. Moreover, the Court's opinion did not sufficiently consider the probable post-entry effect of the proposed acquisition. Pa:rticularly since the entry effect may be most beneficial in
preGisely those cases in which there may also be a beneficial edge
effect,101 a more detailed inquiry would seem to be necessary. However, such an expanded inquiry would not be easy. Direct evidence
of the existence of limit-pricing is often ambiguous,1°2 and, where
reliable post-acquisition evidence is not available, the probable entry
effect is difficult to predict. The most effective method, as ·will be
suggested later,103 may be one that relies on the use of rebuttable
presumptions. ·
·
99. This may occur because nationals can cooperate more easily with other nationals, since they will take into consideration conditions in other markets, rather than
just conditions in the local market.
100. From 1964 to 1969, Narragansett's share of the market slipped from 21.5 per
cent to 15.5 per cent. 410 U.S. at 530 n.11.
101. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
102. See Turner, supra note 2, at 1376.
103. See text accompanying notes 153-64 infra.
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II
In their concurring opinions Justices Marshall and Douglas examined the potential competition problem in somewhat more depth
than the majority. Between them, they suggested two approaches ignored by the district court that might have led to a finding of an
unacceptable loss of potential competition despite the lack of proof
of a subjective intent to enter de novo on the part of the Falstaff
management. First, it was suggested that the question of Falstaff's
status as a probable actual entrant was still open because the lower
court had failed to consider important objective evidence; 104 and,
second, it was suggested that possible anticompetitive effects in the
relatively distant future should be taken into account in evaluating
the merger, even if proof that the acquisition had a present deleterious effect on competition could not be made. 106
Justice Marshall's basic disagreement was with the way that the
district court handled the evidence presented at trial on the question
of whether Falstaff was a probable actual entrant. In particular, he
differed with the trial court's reliance on the statement by Falstaff's
management that it had decided not to enter the market de novo in
the future. He thought that such subjective evidence was unreliable
because "any statement of future intent will be inherently selfserving"106 and that it should thus be given very little weight. Moreover, even if the subjective evidence is accurate as to present intent,
it should not be decisive where there is strong objective evidence
that it is in the firm's economic self-interest to enter de novo and that
the firm is capable of doing so, because there remains the possibility
of a change of mind or a change of management. 107 The trial court's
approach, Justice Marshall said, runs counter to accepted assumptions about corporations as profit-maximizing institutions. 108 Additionally, the use of subjective evidence is particularly inappropriate
where the court must determine how the company would react ,vere
the alternative of entry by acquisition foreclosed. 100 The necessity
of seriously considering the merits of de novo entry may not have
been brought home to the management at the time of the decision
104. 410 U.S. at 571-72 (Marshall, J., concurring).
105. 410 U.S. at 539, 544 (Douglas, J., concurring), 547 (Marshall, J., concurring).
106. 410 U.S. at 568. Justice Marshall's concern is certainly legitimate. Pitofsky has
pointed out that firms with sophisticated legal advice may actually create subjective
evidence formally indicating that the alternative of independent entry was rejected.
Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1024. See also Davidow, supra note 2, at 1245-46.
107. 410 U.S. at 568-69 (Marshall, J., concurring).
108. 410 U.S. at 568.
109. Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1023-24; Comment, supra' note 13, at 160. Pitofsky
has also pointed out that the use of subjective evidence is complicated because each
firm may consist of several different decision-making groups. Pitofsky, supra, at 1021·22,
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to acquire; at the trial, consequently, the firm may well be able to
point to convincing evidence that the option of de novo entry was
considered and rejected.11° A final problem, suggested in the government's brief in Falstafj, 111 is that an overly great reliance on subjective evidence will lead to uncertainty in the application of the
doctrine of potential competition.
Because of these problems, Justice Marshall would give considerably more weight to objective evidence. He would still give some
weight to subjective evidence because it provides one expert interpretation of the objective market forces112 and because "the character
of management is itself essentially an objective factor in determining whether the acquiring firm is an actual potential entrant."113
But Justice Marshall suggested that strong objective evidence, even if
there is credible subjective evidence to the contrary, will usually
be enough to establish "a reasonable chance of fut1:1re competition,"
the loss of which is sufficient for a section 7 violation.114
However, in antitrust cases objective evidence itself raises problems that Justice Marshall ignored. Like subjective evidence, it may
be very hard to assess.115 For instance, most objective characteristics,
such as barriers to entry, are nearly impossible to measure without
considerable cost.116 Furthermore, the interpretation of inconsistent
or conflicting data, an awesome task in the best of situations, is even
more formidable in these cases. As the discussion of limit-pricing
theory indicates,117 economists themselves are not certain what
weight to give to different indicia. This confusion is accentuated in
the judicial setting, for few judges are trained to evaluate such
proof.118 As then Professor Bok pointed out over a decade ago, the
adversary system is particularly unsuited to weighing objective evidence in merger cases, for the truth often lies, not at one end or another of the adversary poles, but somewhere in between.119 Finally,
because, in antitrust cases, conflicting data may be the norm rather
than the exception and because different inferences can rationally be
drawn from the evidence, it may be more possible for judges in such
Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1024.
Brief for the United States at 23-24.
410 U.S. at 564-65.
410 U.S. at 565.
410 U.S. at 570.
See generally Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 278-99 (1960).
•
116. See generally Disner, Barrier Analysis in Antitrust Law, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 862,
905-12 (1973).
117. See text.accompanying notes 68-91 supra.
118. Bok, supra note 115, at 291.
119. "Adversary_litigation is probably at its best where the questions'at issue are of
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
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cases to allow their individual preferences and preconceptions to
color their evaluation of objective facts. 120
These problems associated with the use of objective evidence in
antitrust cases are especially critical when the potential competition
doctrine is involved. In some cases it may be impossible to determine
solely on the basis of objective evidence which of several alternative
courses of expansion a firm was most likely to undertake. Furthermore, many objective facts-such as the amount of a firm's financial
resources and the prestige of its name-that are used to prove that
a firm is a potential entrant because it is in a good position to overcome the barriers to entry take the form of gross data that apply to
many firms. In these situations, the same evidence that establishes
that a firm is a probable entrant also tends to prove that it was not
unique and, thus, that its elimination as a potential competitor has
no anticompetitive effect.121
Some of the difficulties inherent in the use of objective evidence
are less of a problem in market-extension merger cases like Falstaff
than they would be in product-extension merger cases.122 It is probably fair to say that Falstaff's most likely course of expansion was
into beer markets in other geographical areas. It would be more difficult in a product-extension merger case to determine on the basis
of objective evidence alone which of several alternative courses of
expansion the potential entrant was most likely to pursue.123 Also,
in a market-extension merger like that involved in Falstaff the uniqueness requirement will be more easily met, for only a very few other
large firms engaged in the selling of the product will not be in the
relevant geographical market already.124
a predominantly 'either-or' variety, and the problem is largely one of deciding which
side is correct. In the complex statistical and theoretical jungle of a merger proceeding,
few disputes fit this description." Id.
120. Id. at 296.
121. As Davidow illustrates, defendants can tum the use of objective evidence to
their own advantage:
"If all it takes to be a potential entrant," they will say, "is the objective capability,
over time and with considerable effort, to enter the business successfully, and if lack
of evidence of any inclination to do this is irrelevant then my company was indeed
a 'potential entrant'-but so were and are numerous other powerful diversifying
corporations that I will now name!"
Davidow, supra note 2, at 1247.
122. A product-extension merger is one in which the firm acquires a company producing a different product, which is related to a product of the acquiring firm because
it can be produced with a similar production process, sold through the same marketing
channels, or developed through the same research facilities. See Davidow, supra note 2,
at 1232.
123. See P. STEINER, supra note 36.
124. Because these firms already have a developed capability for manufacturing and
selling that product, they are uniquely situated vis-a-vis large firms producing in other
industries. In contrast, there may be many large firms in several different industries
that are equally capable potential entrants by a product-extension merger.
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However, even though Falstaff was a market-extension case, the
basic problem of weighing objective evidence and predicting behavior on that basis was still very evident, especially with regard to
the determination of whether Falstaff was in fact a potential entrant
other than by acquisition of Narragansett. For example, predicted
profitability is a prime determinant of whether a firm will decide to
enter a given market. In Falstaff, the experts could not agree, even
given a single figure for projected profits, whether that figure was
adequate to induce entry other than by large-firm acquisition. A study
commissioned by Falstaff recomn;iended de novo entry,125 but an
independent economist, who testified for Falstaff, felt that the profit
return on de novo entry-6.7 per cent-made it "a very, very poor
investment indeed." 126 It is clear that objective evidence must be
used with some care. Therefore, a serious effort should be made to
develop specific objective criteria that can be given special weight.127
In addition, both Justic!! Marshall and Justice Douglas suggested
that future anticompetitive effects be given more weight than the
trial court thought, appropriate. They argued that a finding of illegality could be made even if Falstaff did not have a present influence on competitive conditions in the market and even if it had
presently decided not to enter the New England market other than
by acquisition of Narragansett.128 In contrast, the Court's opinion
explicitly left open the question whether future anticompetitive
effects could be taken into account in cases like Falstaff. 129
Since the enactment of the revised Clayton Act,130 the Supreme
Court has shown an ever-increasing willingness to consider the ef.,
fects of horizontal mergers and acquisitions on future competitive
conditions.131 This development has naturally carried over to potential competition cases b'ecause the procompetitive effect of a probable actual entrant is, to a more or less attenuated extent, always in
the fut:ure. 132
125. 410 U.S. at 553 (Marshall, J., concurring).
126. 410 U.S. at 554 (Marshall, J., concurring).
127. See Brodley, supra note 2, at 358-59.
128. 410 U.S. at 539, 544 (Douglas, J., concurring), 547 (Marshall, J., concurring).
129. 410 U.S. at 537.
130. Act of Dec. 29, 1950, Ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125.
131. See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963). See generally Bork &: Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 CotuM. L. REv. 363,
368-69 (1965); Blake &: Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 C0LUM, L. REv. 377, 398-99
(1965).
132. Rahl has argued that the probable-actual-entrant variant, unlike the perceivedpotential-entrant form of potential competition, has no place in the statutory scheme
precisely because the loss by merger of that type of firm would have no immediate
effect on competitive conditions:
Where potential competition is offered as a living substitute for the actual competi-
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A firm that has no present procompetitive effect on a market
by virtue of potential-competitor status may come to have such an
effect in either of two ways. First, there may be structural or behavioral changes within the relevant market. Second, the status
of the bystander itself may change so that it becomes a perceived
potential competitor, although at present it is not so perceived by
existing firms, or so that it becomes a probable actual entrant, although at present it is neither interested in nor capable of entering
the market.
One ·way in which structural or behavioral changes may bring
potential competition into play was described by Justice Marshall in
Falstaff:
[E]ven if the market is presently competitive, it is possible that it
might grow less competitive in the future. For e..xample, a market
might be so concentrated that even though it is presently competitive, there is a serious risk that parallel pricing policies might emerge
sometime in the near future. In such a situation, an effective competitor lingering on the fringe of the market-what might be
called a potential perceived potential entrant-could exert a deterrent force when anticompetitive conduct is about to emerge.1aa
Another possible relevant change in the market was recognized in
Kennecott Copper Corporation v. FTC,184 which involved the acquisition of Pea}?ody Coal by Kennecott Copper Corporation. Unlike
the situation suggested by Justice Marshall, the market structure in
Kennecott Copper was not yet a tight oligopoly.136 The court,
however, found the merger unlawful; its decision was based on the
FTC's finding that the market was in the incipient stages of becoming an oligopoly sufficiently tight for tacitly coordinated pricing.186
A change in the attitude or ability of the bystander can occur in
several ways. A likely example was suggested by Justice Marshall,
who described a bystander firm with no present intent to enter that
changes its mind as it more correctly perceives that the objective
tion protected by the statute, it would seem essential to identify the firm or firms
asserted to be potential competitors and to show that their _l)Otential competition
was performing the kind of role performed by actual competition-in other words,
that under the particular circumstances the future potentiality constituted a present
force, keeping "power in check," or enforcing behavior "approaching the com•
petitive norm."
Rahl, Applicability of the Clayton Act to Potential Competition, 12 .AMERICAN DAR
AssN., SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROCEEDINGS 128, 137 (1958). Dut Rabi's narrow view
has been rejected. The Court in Penn-Olin explicitly stated that proof of future competitive effect was relevant to a determination of whether a merger violated section 7,
United States v. Penn-Olin Co., 378 U.S. 158, 177 (1964).
133.
134.
135.
136.

410 U.S. at 560 n.15 (emphasis original).
467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972).
467 F.2d at 75.
467 F.2d at 75.
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factors favor entry.137 In his concurrence Justice Douglas proposed
an example that encompasses both ways in which the potential
competition doctrine can be brought into play in the future: A
firm that has, for the present, decided against entry is led to change
its mind because changes in the market make entry more attractive.1ss
Failing to consider incipient effects could lead to serious problems in the future. Once a merger removes a firm on the edge that
might have become a potential competitor in the future, the possible
benign influence of that firm will be lost forever.139 Because, as
Turner has suggested, there is no antitrust enforcement technique
for dealing directly ·with concentration, a high premium is placed
on preserving all such "significant potentialities of future competition."140 Moreover, permitting a merger· that involves a potential
entrant may even accelerate or initiate a tendency towards a noncompetitive structure. For example, a merger involving one large
potential entrant could trigger acquisitive activity by firms outside
the market or by small firms within the market that must combine
to meet the challenge of the new entrant. In fact, the expansion by
merger of some nationals in the beer industry seems to have been a
considerable motivating factor in later market extensions by other
firms, including Falstaff.141
However, as Justice Marshall acknowledged,142 problems of proof
are compounded when incipient future effects are considered. The
problems may be similar to, and even more difficult than, those that
arise in determining whether a firm is a probable actual entrant.143
Objectiv~ data on the question are difficult to assess, and there is no
guarantee, for example, that the bystander's future behavior will
correspond to predictions made on the basis of such evidence. Thus,
when there is subjective evidence that a firm has made some decision
as to the possibility of entry de novo, it should be entitled tq considerable weight.
Predictions of future anticompetitive effects are most difficult if
the requirement of substantial probability is to be met in such' cases
as Justice Douglas' example of the firm that changes its mind about
137. 410 U.S. at 569.
138. 410 U.S. at 544.
139. 410 U.S. at 561 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also United States v. Wilson
Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 562 (N.D. Ill. 19fj8).
140. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Polides, 82
HARV. L. REv. 1207, 1213 (1969).
141. This is understandable in light of the competitive advantages that accrue to
the national brewers vis-a-vis the regional brewers. See text accompanying note 18
supra.
142. 410 U.S. at 560 n.15.
143. See text accompanying notes 106-27 supra.
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entering a market after there is a change in the market structure.144
In that situation, the court must consider, first, whether market conditions will change so as to make entry more attractive; second,
whether that possible change ·will lead to a change in the attitude or
ability of the bystander so that the bystander will enter the market;
and, third, whether that future entry will be significantly procompetitive, or whether so many other firms will also change their minds
about entry that the loss of one potential entrant by merger will not
be significant.
The problem, then, with the consideration of incipient future
effects is the same problem that pervades other aspects of the potential competition doctrine-the need to predict future firm conduct
on the basis of inadequate structural indicia. Because a finding of
illegality in a case involving Justice Douglas' example would require
that a relatively large number of predictions of future changes in
both market structure and firm behavior be made simultaneously,
courts should be reluctant to find incipient anticompetitive effects
in that situation. Indeed, if :findings of illegality were too easily made
in such cases, there would not be many cases in which potential competition would not be at issue. 145
Moreover, in cases like Kennecott, 146 where there is at present
neither anticompetitive structure nor anticompetitive behavior in
the relevant market, the incipiency notion should lead to a finding
of illegality only after close scrutiny of both the range of possible
potential competitors and the range of possible substitutes for the
relevant product. Where these exist there will probably be sufficient
competitive restraints in the future even if one firm is removed from
the edge of the market by merger. Therefore, in Kennecott, where
there appeared to be a growing number of fuel products that would
substitute for coal147 and where firms in other industries were also
likely to become potential competitors,148 a finding of illegality was
perhaps unwarranted. In contrast, in the bank merger cases now
pending before the Supreme Court,149 a finding of illegality would
be more justifiable, even if the relevant market is not anticompetitive at the time of the acquisition, because there are not likely to be
144. 410 U.S. at 544.
145. See 410 U.S. at 555-56 (Marshall, J., concurring).
146. See text accompanying notes 134-36 supra.
147. See discussion of coal substitutes in United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,
341 F. Supp. 534, 545-46 (N.D. m.), afjd., 42 U.S.L.W. 4368 (U.S., March 19, 1974).
148. See Casenote, 86 HARv. L. REv. 772, 780 (1973).
149. United States v. Connecticut Natl. Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240 (D. Conn. 1973),
prob. juris. noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3386 (U.S., Jan. 7, 1974) (No. 73-767); United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, 1973-1 Trade Cas. 1[ 74,496 (W.D. Wash. 1973), prob. jurls.
noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S., Oct. 15, 1973) (No. 73-38).
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significant new substitutes for certain types of banking services150
and because regulatory policies in that industry make it likely that
future sources of new competition in regional markets within a
state will be few in number.151

III
More specific suggestions can be made for a general approach to
evaluating evidence in cases in which questions of potential competition arise. From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that two requirements must be met by any suggested approach. First, it must
be based on sound economic theory that is predictive of firm behavior. In this respect the Court's implicit reliance on limit-pricing
theory may have been excessive. More specifically, the procompetitive edge effect of the perceived potential competitor should be carefully evaluated,152 and the courts should give more recognition to
other procompetitive effects, especially those attendant upon certain forms of actual entry. Second, adequate provision must be made
for effective judicial administration of the potential competition
doctrine. Neither subjective nor objective evidence is. completely
problem-free. An approach that would be sound in theory and relatively easy to administer could be based on the use of selective presumptions and on the reference to additional objective factors to rebut the presumptions or to aid in decision-making when the presumptions are not applicable.153
A modified version of the "toehold theory" 154 is the most promising source of such a system of presumptions. That theory was first
formulated in the Federal Trade Commission's opinion in Bendix
Corporation.155 The hearing examiner, having found that Bendix
would not have entered the relevant market de novo, dismissed the
case because he felt that Bendix could not be classified as a potential
competitor under then-current doctrine.156 Reversing the decision,
the Commissioners pointed out that adverse effects on competition
may also result from the elimination of a firm that would have
150. See United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963).
151. Baker, Potential Competition in Banking: After Greely, What?, 90 BANK. L.J.
362, 369 (1973).
152. But see Comment, supra note 13, at 174.
153. See generally Brodley, supra note 2, at 358-59.
154. See generally Comment, supra note 13. See also Davidow, supra note 2, at 124849; Berger &: Peterson, supra note 2, at 500-01.
155. [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 11 19,288 (F.T.C. 1970), revd. on
other grounds, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971).
156. 11 19,288 at 21,445.
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entered by acquiring a "toehold" firm, that is, "a small company
capable of expansion into a substantial competitive force.'' 167
The evidentiary effect that should be given to the possibility or
actuality of toehold acquisition has not yet been resolved.1G 8 It is
here suggested that it be used to establish certain presumptions that
would affect the distribution of the burden of proof in product- and
market-extension merger cases. An acquisition of an available toehold firm, for example, would be presumed legal, and a greater
burden of proof of illegality would be placed on the government.
However, in a case involving the acquisition of a leading firm where
the government shows that toehold firms were available for acquisition and that the acquiring firm had the means to acquire them and
to build them into profitable competitive entities, the acquisition
should be presumed illegal, and the burden should shift to the acquiror. These presumptions could be rebutted by such evidence as
that going to actual or potential entry effects, the capability of the
bystander firm to acquire and develop a toehold firm, and the competitive potential of the acquired firm. But, in the great majority of
cases, the operation of the presumptions should be determinative.
The classification of a certain firm as a toehold could be made,
for example, on the basis of its absolute share of the market, its
market share relative to the share of the largest firm in the market,
or its market share relative to the aggregate share of a given number
of the largest firms in the market. Conventional potential competition theory would suggest that only those acquisitions that are tantamount to the addition of competition by de novo entry should be
157. 11 19,288 at 21,445.
Various forms of merger entry other than through acquisition of a leading company-for example, a "toehold" acquisition of a small company capable of e,..:pan•
sion into a substantial competitive force-may be as economically desirable and
beneficial to competition as internal expansion into a relevant market, and must
be considered in assessing the poteyitial competition of the acquiring firm which
has been eliniinated as a result of the challenged merger.
Although previous cases • • • have only involved potential entry in one form,
i.e., by internal expansion, it is clear that the form of entry was not controlling
in these decisions. What was determinative in each of these cases was • • • the
actual eliniination of the additional decision-making, the added capacity, and the
other market stimuli which would have resulted had entry taken a procompetitive
form ••••
,J 19,288 at 21,445 (emphasis original).
The toehold doctrine has played a role in several other cases. See, e.g., United States
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1258 (D.D. Cal. 19'73), appeal doclieted, 42
U.S.L.W. 3471 (U.S., Feb. 9, 1974) (No. 73-1224); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
297 F. Supp. 1061, 1069-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd. sub nom. Bartlett v. United States, 401
U.S. 986 (1971); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 563 (N.D.
Ill. 1968); Stanley Works, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REc. REP. ,! 19,646
(F.T.C. 1971), affd., 469 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 928 (1973): Kenne•
cott Copper Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REc. REP. 1) 19,619 (F.T.C. 1971),
affd., 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972); Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REc. REP. 1117,244 (F.T.C. 1965).
158. See Comment, supra note 13, at 175-77.
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allowed. Otherwise, the acquisition merely replaces one competitive
force with another, while removing the possible beneficial impact
of the outside firm as a perceived potential entrant or a probable
actual de novo entrant.
Presumptions of over-all competitive effect cannot be easily made
when the acquired firm is large but not dominant. In such cases, the
acquisition may merely replace an existing competitive force with a
new one, or it may increase competition by augmenti,ng the vigor
and resources of the acquired firm. Because it will thus be difficult
to weigh the procompetitive effects of entry against the anticompetitive effects of the loss of a potential competitor, the government
should be required to prove its case without presumptions, by the
use of objective evidence such as that describ~d below.159
The use of toehold theory in the form of evidentiary presumptions would be niuch easier to administer than the approaches suggested by the various members of the Court in Falstaff. The trial
courts need no longer be mired in attempts to determine without
adequate actual evidence whether a bystander that acquired a leading firm would have entered the market in another way.16° Furthermore, sorely needed certainty and predictability could be added
through this approach.161 Judicial resources would be conserved, and
businessmen would be able to plan more confidently, especially if
a reverse presumption of legality were made applicable to actual
toehold acquisitions. The result could be to channel merger activity
into procompetitive forms.162
The approach also rests on a sound theoretical basis in that it
places adequate emphasis on the actual or probable effect of entry.
It would allow those acquisitions that will add to competition and
would proscribe those acquisitions that will not have the beneficial
effect that would be achieved through a probable alternative form of
entry. It assumes that such differential impacts can usually be gauged
159. See text accompanying notes 165-77 infra.
160. Comment, supra note 13, at 166. It could be argued, however, that the toehold
theory would be disadvantageous because the uniqueness requirement will be more
difficult to meet, in that a larger number of firms are qualified to make a toehold, in
contrast to a de novo, entry. Id. at 173-74. A strict uniqueness requirement should not
be incorporated in the approach suggested here. First, up to some point, at least, it is
desirable to preserve as many probable actual toehold entrants as possible, since the
probability of at least one of them entering the relevant market is thereby increased.
Second, although several firms may be equally capable of a toehold entry, they may
not be equally interested in entry into the market. The toehold presumption will
not apply unless the firm has actually demonstrated its interest by attempting an acquisition. Finally, uniqueness cannot be evaluated at one point in time. An entrant
that is not unique ex ante may be unique ex post because further_ entry by equally
capable firms is less likely once the entrant has added new capacity. See text preceding
note 176 infra.
161. Comment, supra note 13, at 166.
162, Id. at 166-67,
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by the relative size of the acquired firm. When that assumption is
incorrect,1 63 the normal presumption can be overcome.
Moreover, there is a strong probability that potential competition will be lost in the leading-firm acquisitions to which the presumption of illegality would be applied. It can be assumed that, in
most market- and product-extension cases, the bystander would have
acquired an available small firm in some comparable market if the
alternative of leading-firm acquisition had been definitely foreclosed.
Its financial ability to make such a purchase and its interest in doing
so are shown by its acquisition of the leading firm. Also, in marketand product-extension cases the acquiring and the acquired firms
will have complementary characteristics and experience, so an as. sumption that the toehold is likely to be operated profitably and
made into an important competitive force is not unfounded. The
barriers to entry in product-extension cases may be more easily overcome by toehold acquisition than by de novo entry because the bystanders can benefit from the technical capability and marketing
experience of the toehold firm. And the costs of having to operate at
below optimal scale in a market of only slowly increasing demand
are not as serious if a toehold acquisition is made.164
The theoretical soundness of these presumptions does depend on
the existence of certain conditions that should be kept in mind by
the courts. In cases where the toehold theory is applicable, the lack
of these conditions may overcome the presumption, and, where the
toehold theory is not applicable, the existence or. lack of the conditions should be given special evidentiary weight.
The first condition is that the merger involved be a market- or
product-extension conglomerate merger. The validity of the presumption of illegality in a market-extension acquisition of a leading
firm has been discussed above. Market-extension expansion is easily
perceived by existing firms, and the bystander is often uniquely
capable of entering the market. In fact, market-extension mergers
are so highly suspect that they should be carefully scrutinized even
where the toehold theory is not applicable. In such cases, the courts
should focus on such matters as whether plant-scale or distributional
considerations militate against de novo entry,160 for, if they do not, a
finding of potential-competitor status will often be justified.
If the merger at issue is of the pure conglomerate variety, the
toehold theory should not be applicable, and the courts should be
reluctant to find it illegal in any case. Because the products of the
merging firms are. not complementary and the acquiring firm had
no identifiable relation to the market before the merger, its entry
163. See text accompanying notes 173-75 infra.
164. Cf. text accompanying notes 50-56 supra.
165. See note 55 and text accompanying notes 50-54 supra.
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would have been difficult to predict until the acquisition actually took
place. Therefore, the firm would usually not have been perceived by
existing firms as a potential competitor. For similar reasons, it cannot be said that the firm was a probable actual entrant because it
would often be difficult and unprofitable for it to enter de novo or
by toehold. Since purely-financial considerations often underlie pure
conglomerate mergers,166 the likelihood of a more competitive form
of entry into the same market cannot be inferred from the mere fact
of acquisition itself.167 Moreover, a large number of firms are likely
to have been as well-positioned for entry as the acquiring firm, for
it had no special expertise in the market. Therefore, it would be
difficult to meet the uniqueness requirement in such cases.168 In addition, if leading-firm acquisitions of the pure conglomerate variety, as
well as market- and product-extension acquisitions of leading firms,
were effectively discouraged, society would, to a great extent, lose
both the beneficial effect on inefficient managers of large firms of
the fear of takeovers by firms outside the market,169 and the beneficial effect of the takeovers themselves.
Product-extension mergers fall into a middle ground. Although
they should come within the purview of the toehold theory, in such
cases a finding of illegality should not otherwise be easily made on
the basis of obj~ctive criteria. In a product-extension merger, unlike
most'market-extension mergers, the firm is likely to be equally wellsuited for entry into several other markets, for it could just as easily
choose to expand into any of several complementary products. Moreover, because a large number of firms in several different industries
are likely to be faced ·with approximately the same barriers to entry
for the market, the uniqueness requirement is not likely to be easily
met. Also, a firm involved in a product-extension merger is less
likely to be a potential entrant de novo than a firm involved in a
market-extension merger. The availability of a toehold acquisition
in such cases is important, for it may enable a firm not already producing in the market to overcome any special barriers to entry associated with the relevant market, such as patents or marketing expertise, whereas the availability of a toehold may not be as important
to a firm already producing in the same industry. Therefore, whereas
in all leading-firm JD.arket-extension mergers the burden of proof of
illegality should be somewhat eased, in product-extension mergers
detailed proof that the firm was a unique potential competitor
should be required if the toehold presumptions are not applicable.
166. F. SCHERER, supra note 136, at 113-14.
167. See J. MARKHAM, supra note 73, at 125-26.
168. See Dam, Corporate Takeovers and the Antitrust Laws, 39 ABA .ANrrrnusr L.J.
196, 201 (1969).
169. Id. at 202.
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A second consideration that should be carefully examined by the
courts is the actual entry effect. This concept has already played a
part in developing the potential competition doctrine. Special recognition has been given to the possibility that a large firm will become
dominant after entry,170 and mergers involving potential entrants
have been proscribed where the effect would be to raise the barriers
to entry significantly.171 Also, the entry effect of alternative forms of
acquisitions has, at least implicitly, been acknowledged in the formulation of the toehold theory. Nonetheless, as the discussion of Falstaff
indicates,172 the importance of the entry effect has not received adequate recognition.
It should be given greater weight in at least three different respects. First, it should be recognized that, in markets that are tight
oligopolies, beneficial entry effects may arise even in cases of entry
by large-firm acquisition,173 because such an entry could break down
existing patterns of tacitly collusive behavior. Since the market is
already noncompetitive, there is little to lose in such a situation and
everything to gain. Therefore, the toehold presumption may be rebutted and acquisition allowed, even if, on balance, the entry effect
of a toehold acquisition would have been even better.174
Second, it should be recognized that entry by toehold acquisition
could have a deleterious effect in a loosely oligopolistic market
where the ·present and probable future competitive conditions are
relatively satisfactory. In such a situation, there would be little to
gain by the addition of a new competitive entity and everything to
lose if the new entity became a price leader or otherwise aided anti•
competitive interdependent behavior.170 In these cases the government should be able to overcome the presumptive legality of a toehold acquisition, and a firm that has made a leading-firm acquisition
that is presumptively illegal should be allowed to offer proof that the
alternative form of entry would not have led to a more beneficial
result.
Third, the entry effect of a potential entrant should be given
more explicit consideration in determining whether it is unique. If
the entry of a firm that was not unique before its entry raises barriers to entry, then it could be unique after entry, either because
·

170. See 410 U.S. at 558-59 (Marshall,

J.,

concurring). See also FTC v. Procter

&: Gamble Co., 886 U.S. 568, 575 (1967); Kennecott Copper Corp. v, FTC, 467 F,2d 67,

78 (10th Cir. 1972).
171. See FTC v. Procter &: Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967); United States v.
Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 557, 563 (N.D. Ill. 1968),
172. See text accompanying notes 94-100 supra.
173. See te.,_t accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
174. P. STEINER, supra note 36.
175. Id.
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other bystander firms have been eliminated from the edge of the
market or because their entry has become much less likely. Similarly,
if an entry reduces barriers to entry, then a potential entrant that
was unique before entry may not be after e::_ntry.176 This would appear to be relatively unlikely but may occur when the entry demonstrates to other bystanders that entry is either more feasible or more
profitable than they had previously thought.177
If the approach detailed at length above were applied in Falstaff
on remand, it is likely that the merger-would be found to be illegal,
a result that also seems likely under the approach required by ·the
opinion of the Court. The presumption of illegality in a leading-firm
acquisition when a to~hold is available should probably be applied,
because there is evidence that Falstaff could have acquired a smaller
brewer in the New England market and made it into a competitive
force. 178 Even if the government could not establish that the presumption should be applied, the fact that a market-extension merger
was involved should lead the court to scrutinize the acquisition carefully. Finally, in this type of case, where there is a trend toward concentration179 and the acquiring firm is likely to be one of the few
remaining sources of new competition,180 the possibility that Falstaff's existence on the edge of the market would have a future procompetitive effect should be taken into account.
There is a possibility that Falstaff could rebut a presumption of
illegality. However, that rebuttal would be difficult. For example, it
is unlikely that Falstaff could demonstrate that the merger would
have significant beneficial effects on the New England market. Furthermore, under the toehold presumption, Falstaff would have the
burden of proving that it would not have entered through toehold
acquisition if the alternative of entering through acquisition of a
leading firm had been foreclosed; this burden would be difficult to
carry because of Falstaff's demonstrated interest in the market and
its previous history of expansion through the acquisition of small
firms. Nonetheless, Falstaff could demonstrate that there are substantial advantages in entry through the acquisition of a large firm because it can operate at closer to optimal scale than it could if it had
entered through a toehold, and that argument may persuade the
court. Falstaff's previous history of expansion by acquiring weak
"r

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Jurisdictional Statement of United States at 14-15. The government pointed
to three small breweries in the New England market that Falstaff could have acquired.
Because Falstaff was a large and experienced seller with a well-known name, it is likely
it could build a small brewer into an effective competitor.
179. 410 U.S. at 549-50.
180. Elzinga, supra note 44, at 202.
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breweries should not be determinative, because, if such a strategy
proved to be unprofitable, Falstaff may have been unwilling to continue it.
Even if the result under the suggested approach would, in Falstaff, lead to the same result as the Court's analysis, it should be preferred because it rests upon a more secure theoretical base and provides a more efficient and predictable means of deciding future cases.

